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The euro crisis was, besides an economic and sovereign debt crisis, a full-blown 
banking crisis. The Banking Union was thus created precisely to break the vicious 
circle of ailing banks and weak government finances in the Eurozone. For the 
moment, it consists of a European banking supervision and a single resolution 
framework. But the project remains incomplete. How stable are Europe's banks 
almost eight years after the start of the euro crisis and what is in store for the 
Banking Union? 
Banking Union: 
How stable are  
Europe’s banks? 
“It is important to ensure that savings are equally 
protected in all member states, thus further 
weakening the link between the banks and the 
sovereigns.”
Michael Noonan, Irish Finance Minister 
in Brussels on the sidelines of the EU Council of Ministers 
on 8 December 2015
“As regards non-performing loans, which is a 
problem in many countries, we recognise that 
there is much more to be done. And banks need 
some supervisory pressure to do what they  
need to do.”
Danièle Nouy, President of the  
European Single Supervisory Mechanism
in an interview with La Repubblica on 30 January 2017
Why are national 
banking crises a 
European problem?
Bailout 
In a bailout, the govern-
ment protects a bank from 
insolvency by providing 
financial assistance. The 
alternative to a bailout is 
a bail-in. Here, the bank’s 
shareholders and creditors 
take part in financing a 
fundamental restructuring 
or unwinding.
European Single  
Resolution Mechanism 
There is a set decision- 
making and liability process 
for an insolvent bank.  
Initially, its owners and 
creditors share the losses, 
then aid is provided from  
a 55 billion euro fund,  
a collective European  
resolution fund financed  
by the banks themselves.
The global financial crisis presented 
particular challenges for the Eurozone. 
The introduction of the euro acceler- 
ated the integration of its banking 
sector. Banks from countries experi- 
encing high levels of growth such 
as Spain and Ireland borrowed a lot 
of money from German and French 
banks. That may have been good 
for the economy, but it also led to a 
dependency on foreign financing. 
When the financial crisis started, the 
flow of credit from abroad stopped 
since it was unclear if governments 
in the crisis countries would be able 
to support their banking sectors. The 
loss of confidence between banks 
damaged the economy throughout 
Europe.
The interplay between banks and 
government finances contributed to 
the escalation of the euro crisis. This 
so-called sovereign-bank nexus took 
effect in two ways: 
On the one hand, governments tried  
to prevent the collapse of the financial 
system during the crisis and supported 
their banking sectors with loans or  
guarantees. Such bank rescues, also 
called  bailouts, amounted to roughly  
five percent of total economic output in 
the Eurozone between 2008 and 2014. 
Some countries were overwhelmed 
by the financial burden of the bail - 
out. For example, the Irish govern- 
ment overreached itself in bailing 
out its banking sector, with the effect 
that a banking crisis turned into a 
sov ereign debt crisis.
On the other hand, banks suffered 
from weak government finances 
since they traditionally hold a lot of 
their own government’s sovereign 
debt. In the case of Italian banks, 
this is currently ten percent of all 
their assets. If paying these back 
becomes uncertain, confidence in  
the banks’ stability declines.
Initially, the Eurozone lacked the 
instruments to prevent the spill-over 
of the banking crisis from one country 
to another. Each government had to 
cover their bailouts by themselves, 
which led to large distortions in the 
risk assessment of countries and 
banks. The creation of a joint super-
visory authority and uniform rules 
for insolvent banks in the form of a 
 European Single Resolution Mechanism 
for banks helped to weaken the link 
between banks and states as well as 
cross-border contagion. 
“We are the EU country that paid the least for the 
bank bailout. The Italian banking system as a 
whole is not in a crisis. In Italy we have roughly 
600 banks; eight of them have problems.”
Pier Carlo Padoan, Italian Finance Minister
in an interview with Die Welt on 11 January 2017
Deposit insurance  
scheme 
To prevent a bank run  
caused by panicky 
depositors dur ing a banking 
crisis and protect their 
savings, the government 
guarantees deposits. In  
the EU, savings deposits of  
up to 100 000 euro are 
protected. Since no pan-
European fund has been 
set up, this must be met 
by national funds in any 
serious case for now.
Non-performing loans 
If households and compa- 
nies are behind hand in re- 
paying their debt for 90 days 
or more, their loans are 
considered to be at risk of 
default or non-performing. 
Such loans have very little 
value and damage the bank’s 
balance sheet as a result.
Has Europe made 
its banks safer?
The euro crisis reached a temporary 
peak in early 2012. Interest rates of 
Greek government bonds rose from 
five percent in 2009 to 49 percent in 
January 2012; yields on Portuguese 
bonds rose to 17 percent. The crisis 
even threatened to spread to Italy, 
the third-largest economy in the 
Eurozone.
The meeting of the European Council 
in June 2012 represented a turning 
point and defused the euro crisis 
on a sustainable basis. The heads of 
state and government gave the green 
light for a two-pillar banking union: 
a single resolution framework for 
ailing banks and a European banking 
supervision under the umbrella of the 
European Central Bank (ECB). These 
are important steps to mitigate the 
government-bank nexus. A common 
 deposit insurance scheme was also 
discussed, but has not been intro-
duced for the time being.
The banking sector could not be freed  
from all risks overnight. In 2013 and 
2014, the bulk of legislation required 
for the Banking Union was passed. 
The new supervisory authority began 
its work in 2014 with the first stress 
test, a crisis simulation for bank bal-
ance sheets. The test revealed capi-
tal shortfalls in 13 of the 130 largest 
European banks. On average, banks 
have strengthened their balance 
sheets since then, but in some coun-
tries they still retain large amounts of 
 non-performing loans on their books.
Since 2016 there are also uniform 
rules and mechanisms in place in 
the event of a bank failure. The 
Single Resolution Board first decides  
on whether and how an ailing bank 
can be aided. Accessing the funds 
within the Single Resolution Mecha- 
nism in any restructuring requires 
the creditors to cover a portion of 
the losses themselves (bail-in). 
This should protect taxpayers from 
incalculable costs of a banking crisis. 
Furthermore, it helps to align the 
competitive conditions in the Euro- 
zone since even banks from finan-
cially strong countries can no longer 
count on government aid.
“The [banks] should be liable themselves, not the 
taxpayers. It is no argument that the risk should  
be shifted from the taxpayers in one country to  
the taxpayers in other countries.”
Wolfgang Schäuble, German Federal Minister of Finance 
in a speech to the German Parliament on 8 September 2015
A look 
ahead
“The Banking Union played a key role in defusing the euro crisis. Today, taxpayers and bank depositors are 
better protected against the consequences of a bank failure thanks to the new rules and institutions. But 
some member states joined the Banking Union with large amounts of distressed debt. The priority should be 
to free the banks in crisis countries from non-performing loans. Then the rules in the Banking Union will 
be easier to apply in the future.” 
Philipp Ständer
The author is a Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin.
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Four of the 13 banks that 
have failed European stress 
tests due to capital short falls 
since 2014 came from Italy. 
Not all of them have been 
able to recapitalise them selves  
suf ficiently in the following 
years. 
The ECB and the European 
Commission must decide 
individually for each bank  
on the admissibility of  
a recapitalisation by the 
national government. 
As the number of corpo-
rate insolvencies rose, 
non-performing loans 
climbed to 18 percent in 
2014. Italian banks hold 
roughly 30 percent of all 
loans at risk of default in 
the Eurozone.
Between December 2016 
and March 2017, three 
of the four banks at risk 
requested government 
aid in the form of a  
precautionary recapital-
isation. Italy has already 
approved 20 billion euro 
for this.
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The economic crisis has 
not yet come to an end in 
Italy. In 2016, GDP was 
still seven percent below 
the level in 2007.
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 SCENARIO 1 
Comprehensive and collective clean-up
There is now a dangerously high number of non-performing loans 
(NPLs) in six euro-area countries. The banks need to be freed of 
these loans as quickly as possible in order to regain profitability and 
grant new loans to companies. Banks in Cyprus, Greece, Italy and 
Portugal are particularly affected.
If they wish to get their banks on solid footing swiftly, governments 
and European institutions could jointly set up a state-backed fund 
that buys their NPLs at a reasonable price. The losses resulting from 
this would have to be covered initially by the owners and creditors 
under the new rules of the Banking Union. This could require the 
restructuring of some banks and even lead to insolvencies.
If the European banking sector is freed of most of its bad debt, it would 
also be easier for the Eurozone countries to complete the Ban king 
Union. On the one hand, risks would have to be further reduced by 
allowing banks to retain only a limited number of their country’s 
sovereign bonds. On the other, the remaining risks would have to be 
increasingly shared, for example, through a European deposit insur-
ance scheme that collectively guarantees citizens’ savings deposits.
 SCENARIO 2 
Member states vs. EU supervision
A rapid and complete clean-up of banks may not be attractive since 
recognition of the losses on NPLs could mean insolvency for some of 
them. In this second scenario, some governments might wish to help 
their domestic banking sector with a state-financed bailout, albeit 
banned since the entry into force of the Single Resolution Mechanism. 
Any violation of these rules could lead to an open dispute between 
governments and the European supervisory authorities.
If individual countries break with the principle of “same rules for all”, 
that will put at risk the necessary mutual trust for future cooperation. 
It would also fail to result in a long-term compromise between risk 
sharing and risk reduction – and thus the Banking Union would remain 
incomplete.
Any failure in the effort to keep moving ahead with the Banking Union 
is risky for two reasons: First, a showdown between governments and 
European institutions would slow down even further the already pro-
tracted reduction of distressed debt, and a weak banking sector would 
continue to harm the economy. Second, the sustainability of sovereign 
debt in some euro-area countries could come under renewed question 
in the next crisis without the completion of the Banking Union.
 SCENARIO 3 
Exceptions subject to conditions
Since the ban on bailouts, banks can only rely on financial support 
from the European Resolution Mechanism if creditors cover a por-
tion of the losses themselves. The risk here is that banks lend money 
to each other and thus the insolvency of one bank may cause losses 
at the next. Accordingly, even with the new regime contagion in the 
banking sector cannot be ruled out. 
In this third scenario, individual member states would be allowed to 
restructure their banks at their own cost and under strict conditions 
and thereby settle once and for all the hangover from the crisis. 
Here, shareholders and creditors would share the losses to a limited 
extent only. Banks in crisis countries could then supply their econo-
mies with sufficient credit again. The price for this would be higher 
sovereign debt.
Whether there would be any extension of the Banking Union after 
such exceptions depends on the extent to which the member states 
are confident that the rules will be complied with in future. Coun-
tries with no interest in easing the rules could conceivably require 
commitments to reduce sovereign debt and economic reforms in 
crisis countries as the price for allowing any exceptions.
The relationship between the costs of the bank bailouts and the rise in sovereign debt is not 
entirely clear in the Eurozone. In Germany, the bank bailout was responsible for a majority of 
the increase in sovereign debt; in Italy and France, by contrast, there were no net costs from 
bank bailouts until 2014. Nonetheless, sovereign debt rose rapidly in these countries during 
the economic crisis.
Source: ECB.
Non-performing loans rose throughout Europe as a result of the euro crisis. Since 2013, however, 
they have been f alling again on average in the EU. Particularly banks in Ireland, Slovenia and Spain 
have been able to greatly reduce their share of non-performing loans. In Cyprus, Greece, Portugal 
and Italy, by contrast, there has not been any sustainable recovery to date. 
Source: ECB, European Banking Authority, author’s calculation.
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